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The International Law and Politics of Acid
Rain
ARMIN ROSENCRANZ
I. INTRODUCTION
.The Environmental Law Institute, headquartered in Washington,
D.C., has conducted an international comparative study of transboundary
air pollution since early 1979. This study focuses on sulfur oxides (SOx)
and acid rain. Its findings and conclusions, however, may also apply to
carbon dioxide CO,' another airborne pollutant which crosses national
boundaries, even though sulfur dioxides are primarily regional pollu-
tants,' whereas carbon dioxide envelops the entire globe. But CO, and
SOx both have been unamenable to abatement primarily for scientific
and economic reasons.' This article will be limited to a discussion of
transboundary air pollution by SOx and acid rain,4 and will leave to
Armin Rosencranz directed the International Comparative Study of Transboundary Air
Pollution, Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C. A.B., 1958, Princeton University;
J.D., 1962, Ph.D., 1970, Stanford University. The research for this article was supported by
the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
1. CO, is the most likely cause of world climate change in the next century, and SOx is
the main cause of acid rain. Both enter the atmosphere and can be carried across national
boundaries. The continuing increase of both compounds is due largely to the increased com-
bustion of coal and oil to produce electric power in industrial countries. Coal and oil are
carbon-based and contain significant quantities of sulfur. The Secretariat of the United Na-
tions Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) estimates that energy consumption in Eu-
rope and North America will increase 70% by 1990 and will triple by 2020. See [1980] 3
INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 101. Even if this demand were to stabilize at current levels, the
environmental changes are likely to be both irreversible and irremediable. To protect the
environment and maintain current levels and patterns of agricultural productivity, future
power must be generated from renewable, sulfur-free and carbon-free energy sources, such
as solar, wind, geothermal, or tidal sources. Otherwise, our only hope is that natural homeo-
static processes will somehow buffer and neutralize the effects of sulfur and carbon
compounds.
2. Sulfur oxides originating in the United States may travel to Canada and those
originating in Britain or Germany may travel to Scandinavia. Sulfur oxides generally travel
hundreds of miles, although some scientists conjecture that the Arctic haze may consist of
sulfates (SO,) originating two thousand miles away in the United States.
3. Both CO. and SOx have not been amenable to abatement for several reasons. First,
scientists have been uncertain about the nature and extent of their effects. Second, the gen-
eral public has been largely complacent about CO, and SOx increases and their supposed
effects. Third, with the exception of sportfishing communities in acid-sensitive regions, no
vocal economic interest group yet perceives a sufficient economic disadvantage from in-
creased CO, and SOx to compel governmental abatement action. Fourth, utilities have per-
sistently minimized the danger of increased CO, and SOx and have steadfastly resisted
costly and energy-intensive abatement pressures.
4. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution is not, on its face, lim-
ited to acid rain, but that is what the proposers, Norway and Sweden, and the signatories,
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others to draw any comparisons with CO.
The major thesis of the article is that, notwithstanding the legal doc-
trines clearly recognized by the Trail Smelter Arbitration5 and Principle
21 of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm,6 international law is ineffective in the field of transboundary
air pollution, and invariably gives way to considerations of national and
international politics. Nations control pollution only if and when it is in
their national interest to do so, and not because of any obligation under
international law to do so.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
At the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the
problem of Scandinavian lake acidification from airborne sulfur com-
pounds originating outside Scandinavia was first brought to international
attention. The Conference produced a Declaration of Principles: Principle
21, the most pertinent to this discussion, provides that "States have, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States. .. .
This principle has impressive antecedents. In 1949, the International
Court of Justice held in The Corfu Channel Case$ that Albania had an
obligation to warn British users of its waters that those waters contained
minefields. The Court recognized "every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States."
With respect to transboundary pollution, the Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion,"0 which helped to resolve a protracted air pollution dispute in the
1920's and 1930's between Canada and the United States, is particularly
had in mind. The Convention was drawn up and adopted by the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe. Done Nov. 13, 1979, 1 U.N. ECE, Annex I, U.N. Doe. E/ECE/
HLM.1/2 (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1442 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ECE
Convention]. For a more exact definition of "acid rain," see note 51 infra.
5. The Tribunal gave a preliminary award on April 16, 1938, and the final award on
March 11, 1941. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1911 (1938); id. at 1905 (1941). The decisions of the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal are also
reported in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939) and 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941). For an indepth
discussion of the case, see Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50
OR. L. REV. 259 (1971).
6. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm,
5-16 June 1972), 1 U.N. GAOR (21st plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 Rev.1 (1972),
reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Declaration].
7. Id. For a general discussion of other principles of the Stockholm Declaration dealing
more specifically with transboundary pollution, see J. BARRos & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF PoLLTIroN (1974).
8. The Corfu Channel Case (Albania v. United Kingdon), [1949] I.C.J. 4.
9. Id. at 22.
10. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
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relevant. Canada conceded that fumes from a smelter at Trail, British
Columbia, were causing damage in adjacent areas in the state of Wash-
ington' and a tribunal was created to determine, inter alia, the amount of
damages. In widely quoted dictum, the tribunal asserted that "[n]o State
has a right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another.. . when the case
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and con-
vincing evidence.""
Long before the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the United States Su-
preme Court had declared through Justice Holmes in Georgia v. Tennes-
see Copper Co.,'2 that:
[I]t is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that
the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by
sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better
or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered,
should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not
be endangered from the same source."3
Generally, these principles derive from the Roman legal maxim sic
utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.1' Unfortunately, neither principles nor
maxims are of much consequence in the case of transboundary air pollu-
tion."3 Nations rarely relinquish jurisdiction over cases of pollution ema-
nating from their territory, and even more rarely admit liability for such
pollution. The Trail Smelter Arbitration's is, in fact, sui generis: Canada
admitted liability and agreed to allow U.S. courts to assess damages.
When the U.S. courts declined to do so, both countries agreed to let a
special binational tribunal "arbitrate" the amount of damages. There has
been no case like this before or since, and the circumstances of the case
are unlikely to arise again.
11, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965.
12. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
13. Id. at 238.
14. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (5th ed. 1979).
15. Transboundary water pollution is more susceptible to international adjudication
and dispute settlement referring to these principles because the sources of water pollution
are more determinable than the sources of air pollution, especially long-range air pollution.
For the prevailing view in the international community regarding transboundary water pol-
lution, see Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, art. X, U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 4/274, reprinted in YEuOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1(Part 2), at 357; also reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW As-
SOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIrYy-SECOND CONFERENCE, HELSKIKI 484 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Helsinki Rules]. The Helsinki Rules provide for abatement of pollution causing "substan-
tial injury" to another state and for the offending state to compensate the injured co-basin
state for any damages. For a general history of international efforts, see R. M'GONIGLE & M.
ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979); L. TELCLAFF & A. UrroN, IN-
TERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1974).
16. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
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Nations today are exceedingly protective of both their sovereignty
and their pollution prerogatives. They are especially resistant to sugges-
tions that they add pollution control costs to the already high cost of
producing electric power, even though they may admit that the produc-
tion of that power causes unintended but real damage in other coun-
tries.17 In the words of one international diplomat, "one can't expect Eu-
rope to reduce its sulfur emissions just to save some Scandinavian fish." '
Scandinavian environmental officials themselves concede the temerity
and impracticality of their request for abatement of European sulfur
pollution.
III. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
The recent Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(ECE Convention)1" seems to be the perfect solution to the victim coun-
tries' need for international recognition of the acid rain problem and the
polluting countries' need to continue to pollute. The ECE Convention du-
tifully invokes Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in its preamble,
but the West German government reportedly stipulated that preambles
have no force of law and that in any case it does not hold itself legally
bound by Principle 21.20 The ECE Convention is the first international
accord on air pollution and was hailed by its chairman, Olof Johansson of
Sweden, as "a breakthrough in the development of international environ-
mental law." 1 However, it provides merely for the sharing of information,
collaborative research, and continued monitoring of pollutants and rain-
fall. It contains no numerical goals, limits, timetables, abatement mea-
sures or enforcement provisions. Signatories have merely undertaken to
"endeavor to limit, and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent
air pollution, including long-range transboundary air pollution. 2 They
have also agreed to adopt "the best available technology economically
feasible."' No country has to alter its status quo unless it chooses to. To
date, there are few indications that any but the victim countries (Sweden,
Norway, Canada, and the United States) are considering further sulfur
pollution control measures.
17. See Bird, Environmental Policy Making: Liability for Externalities in the Pres-
ence of Transaction Costs, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 487 (1980); d'Arge & Kneese, State Liabil-
ity for International Environmental Degradation: An Economic Perspective, id. at 427.
18. Interview with Henri Smets, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, Environment Directorate (Apr. 20, 1979).
19. ECE Convention, note 4 supra. The Economic Commission for Europe is a United
Nations regional organization with 34 member states, including Eastern and Western Euro-
pean countries, Canada, and the United States.
20. Reported from an interview with Henri Smets, Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, Environment Directorate (Nov. 20, 1979).
21. Official remarks of the Chairman of the High Level Meeting within the Framework
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe on the Protection of the Environ-
ment (Nov. 15, 1979).
22. ECE Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. [Emphasis added].
23. Id. art. 6. [Emphasis added].
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The European Community, whose memberstates include Western
Europe's major polluters (Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Den-
mark, the Netherlands and Belgium), enacted on July 15, 1980, its long-
awaited SO, Directive.' 4 The resolution accompanying this directive in-
corporates verbatim the ECE Convention formula "to endeavor to limit,
and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution.. ..
The Directive is so weak that at least two environmentally progressive
countries, the Netherlands and Denmark, were reluctant to approve it.
The senior air pollution official in the Dutch Ministry of Health and the
Environment estimated that less than five percent of the land area of
European Community member states would fail to conform to the new
SO, standard at the time of its enactment." Member states can appar-
ently comply with virtually no change in present practices and with no
appreciable impact on SO, emissions or on the total sulfur load in the
atmosphere over Europe.
IV. BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Multilateral action is necessary to cope with the problem of trans-
boundary SOx pollution in Europe since numerous countries contribute
to the sulfur load. In the context of North American SOx emissions and
the resulting acid rain, however, a bilateral arrangement between the
United States and Canada would be both more efficient and easier to en-
force than would a multilateral treaty. Both countries are "victims" of
acid rain since both have large acid-sensitive regions.27 The United States
sends three times as much sulfur pollution to Canada as it receives from
that country, but Canada exports far more SOx per capita than does the
United States."8 Thus, acid rain is a mutual problem and the two coun-
tries have a mutual interest in abating its flow across their common bor-
der. But Canadian and American negotiators are still far away from a
formal agreement after three years of talks. Moreover, both countries are
now contemplating energy programs which would increase their SOx pol-
lution" in the face of this supposed mutual interest and, more impor-
24. Directive on SO, and Suspended Particulates, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 229) 779
(1980), reported in [1980] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 3315.281.
25. ECE Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
26. Interview with Albert Adriaanse, Dutch Ministry of Health and the Environment,
The Hague (Apr. 26, 1979).
27. Typically, these are regions with granite bedrock which have no capacity to neutral-
ize or "buffer" any acid introduced to the water or soil above the bedrock. Much of eastern
Canada and the northeastern United States is acid-sensitive.
28. SIERRA, May-June, 1980, at 41.
29. For example, during 1980, at President Carter's urging, the U.S. Congress consid-
ered legislation under which 80 oil-fired power plants will be converted to coal. Coal-fired
plants in the United States emit considerably more sulfur oxides than oil. No provision was
to be made to install scrubbers or other pollution-reducing technology in these converted
plants. Similarly, in June 1980, President Carter conferred in Venice with the leaders of six
other industrial countries (Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany), and
all conferees determined to double coal use during the next 10 years, notwithstanding the
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tantly, in abrogation of the ECE Convention which they both so recently
signed.
In the waning days of the Carter presidency, presumably in anticipa-
tion of a new administration even less disposed to controlling power plant
emissions than were their predecessors, the Canadian Parliament enacted
legislation authorizing its federal government to reduce pollution from
sources contributing to problems (viz. acid rain) in other countries.30 The
immediate and perhaps sole effect of this legislation was to give life to
section 7415 of the U.S. Clean Air Act,"1 under which the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) can compel states to reduce air pollu-
tion when such pollution has been found by a duly constituted interna-
tional agency82 to endanger public health and welfare in a foreign
country, if and only if the foreign country has the legal ability to take
reciprocal action under the same circumstances. The effectiveness of sec-
tion 7415 has been at stake because it was unclear whether Canada,
whose federal government has generally deferred to its provinces in pollu-
tion control matters, could reciprocate. The recent Canadian legislation
apparently removed that cloud, but in actuality it has accomplished little
more than to enable the then EPA Administrator to issue a hortatory
statement saying that his staff would examine the issue and recommend
that the offending state be formally notified. Such recommendations must
come before President Reagan's EPA Administrator, and prompt or sig-
nificant remedial action seems highly unlikely.
The above example serves as one indication that the whole subject of
transboundary air pollution is fraught with political and economic consid-
erations which have little to do with international law and agreements,
and which may effectively neutralize domestic law with international
purposes.
V. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
Numerous agreements, most notably the 1979 ECE Convention, pro-
mote international consultation and cooperation in research, monitoring,
and assessment of the environmental impacts of present or planned
fact that six of the seven conferees are signatories of the ECE Convention.
Finally, Canada has gone ahead with its pre-ECE Convention plans to build two new
large power plants adjacent to pristine wilderness areas in Montana and Minnesota. Re-
sponding to suggestions that these plants could result in significant deterioration in the air
quality of adjacent areas in the United States, John Messer, the former Saskatchewan Min-
ister of Energy, declared: "It is our position that we don't have to abide by the laws of other
countries." Interview with Robert Sugarman, Former Chairman, United States Section, In-
ternational Joint Commission (Mar. 20, 1981).
30. Clean Air Amendment Act, [19811 C.C.L. 706, at 9.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
32. The agency is the United States-Canada International Joint Commission, which has
repeatedly found that acid rain results from the long-range transport of air pollutants
originating from sources in both countries. See SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON GREAT LAKES
WATER QUALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (Oct. 1980).
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sources of pollution." However, nothing in the present international legal
framework effectively fosters preventive action. General principles con-
cerning the responsibilities of nations to compensate for the damages
caused by transboundary pollution may occasionally be useful in allocat-
ing expenses and may have some deterrent value, but they do little to
avoid the permanent environmental damage that can be expected from
acid rain and perhaps from the greenhouse effect of increased CO pro-
duction." These general principles are no help in describing the point at
which a nation's interest in industrial development must yield to concerns
over the effects of transboundary pollution.
Moreover, there is no mechanism to enforce any international legal
doctrine that is not made part of a sovereign nation's domestic law. No
international agency is ceded the power to enforce international environ-
mental principles or, indeed, "binding" international treaties and agree-
ments.3 5 The most respected of international adjudicatory bodies, the In-
ternational Court of Justice, may rule on a case only after the involved
countries have consented to a referral, which is a rare occurrence."6 In the
only two major international environmental cases where the involved na-
tions consented to be bound by the decision of a neutral tribunal, 7 the
claimants were required to demonstrate specific causes of specific envi-
ronmental injury."8 Unfortunately, because of the incomplete scientific
understanding of both the atmospheric chemistry and the effects of trans-
ported sulfur pollutants, one cannot yet establish that specific sources are
responsible for acidification of distant lakes and soils." If action had to
await a clear link between emissions and distant environmental effects, or
the full determination of the damage by acidity, irreversible damage
would almost certainly take place in various parts of the world.40
VI. DOMESTIC PROCEDURES TO RESOLVE TRANSBOUNDARY DISPUTES
Domestic procedures are sometimes successfully enlisted to resolve
international environmental disputes," especially when there are no diffi-
33. This discussion primarily addresses transboundary air pollution, but may also apply
to transboundary water pollution.
34. See generally texts cited in notes 7 & 15 supra.
35. Directives of the Council of the European Communities are incorporated into the
domestic laws of the member states and, accordingly, have a status different from that of
other multilateral agreements.
36. I.C.J. STAT. arts. 36, 37.
37. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905
(1941); The Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957).
38. The Trail Smelter Arbitration, for example, refers to a state's obligation not to
allow the air pollution to affect another state where injury is established by clear and con-
vincing evidence.
39. See generally the sources cited in note 17 supra.
40. See note 2 supra.
41. See W. Poro v. Houillieres du Bassin de Lorraine, OLGE Bayern, Saarbrocken
(1957), where a German motel owner sued a French electric power plant, whose emissions of
soot and smoke damaged crops, flowers, and the recreation business in German territory
1981
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cult choice of law questions and where the source of the injury and
amount of damages are determinable. The effects of increased acidifica-
tion such as loss of fish stocks, enhanced corrosion, and reduced agricul-
tural productivity, are compensable types of injury; but judgments for
damages are poorly suited to disputes arising from transboundary acid
rain pollution. The multiplicity of sources and their relative contribution
to atmospheric loadings make it difficult to prove a claim, assign liability,
or provide effective remedies.
If polluters' national courts were willing, for example, to apply Prin-
ciple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration or any of its predecessors or succes-
sors42 against their own offending citizens, then such principles of inter-
national law would have teeth. Thus far, no country's courts have been so
aggressive, although several courts have entertained suits involving extra-
territorial damage..4 Attitudes of self-interest and national autonomy re-
garding environmental problems are shared by judges as well as by legis-
lators and bureaucrats, and these attitudes seem unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future.
VII. PROGNOsIs: LIMITED ABATEMENT BUT INCREASED AWARENESS
Current controls, including general principles of international law
and the ECE Convention, are not adequate to abate SOx emissions suffi-
ciently to remedy the transboundary acid rain problem." Numerous con-
trol strategies, policies, and technologies are available and could be ex-
tremely effective, but few nations seem willing to bear the cost.45 Indeed,
the pressures today are in the opposite direotion, viz., to relax air quality
and emissions standards to thereby make coal-generated electric power
more efficient and economical.46
The prospects for timely action look bleak. Sweden and Norway will
undoubtedly call on the ECE Convention signatories to implement its
principles. The polluting countries will probably continue to call for proof
of damage, identification of specific sources, and resolution of scientific
uncertainties. The polluters may propose to bear the modest costs of lim-
across the border. The German court awarded damages pursuant to French law. Subse-
quently, the defendant company installed effective pollution control equipment financed by
joint French-German government contributions pursuant to a pre-existing French-German
treaty dealing, inter alia, with boundary pollution control.
42. See notes 5, 8, 12 & 37 supra.
43. In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), the United States Su-
preme Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, but implicitly confirmed the com-
petence of Ohio's state courts to deal with the transnational disputes involved. See also
Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1962).
44. Notes 22 & 29 supra.
45. Note 17 supra.
46. See, e.g., note 29 supra, for a discussion of industrialized nations' decision to switch
from oil to coal.
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ing acidified lakes, an offer which the recipient countries will undoubtedly
reject as an inadequate substitute for abatement and as potentially dan-
gerous to aquatic ecosystems.
The Stockholm Declaration stimulated the creation of numerous na-
tional institutions to protect the environment and promoted world aware-
ness of the acid rain phenomenon, if not of its danger. The ECE Conven-
tion, like multilateral agreements on water quality and marine pollution,
4
7
may at a minimum help maintain the environmental status quo and per-
haps bring about voluntary improvements in the environment. Neverthe-
less, no international principles or practices, and certainly not the quali-
fied language of the ECE Convention,"' can compel remedial action.
The most likely area for progress may come through implementing
the ECE Convention's provisions for exchanging available information on
"major changes in national policies and in general industrial develop-
ment, and their potential impact, which would be likely to cause signifi-
cant changes in long-range transboundary pollution. 4 9 Aggressive imple-
mentation by victim countries of this provision and of its attendant
notice and consultation requirements would afford an opportunity to at-
tract media and citizen attention in the polluting countries. This could
exert a salutary influence on the polluters' plans for sulfur control.
The projected dissemination by the Secretariat of the Economic
Commission for Europe of member states' energy scenarios could offer
another wedge for victim countries to influence the policies of the pollut-
ing countries. Information exchanges among ECE countries on developing
coal-utilization technologies should guarantee rapid dissemination of new
technological developments. Broad multilateral subscription to such tech-
nologies may yield economies of a scale sufficient to make them afforda-
ble. Finally, ECE-mandated multilateral research on crop damage and
health effects from sulfate aerosols and acid rain may sooner or later
demonstrate clearly both the cost-effectiveness and the necessity of con-
trolling and abating sulfur emissions throughout the industrial world. Ul-
timately, that should induce responsible officials to revise upward their
estimates of what is economically feasible. 50
47. Probably the most notable are the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Helsinki, Mar. 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 Irr'L LEGAL
MAT. 544 (1974); Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, adopted Feb. 21, 1974, opened for signature June 4, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 352 (1974); and the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution, done at Barcelona, Feb. 16, 1976, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 290
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Mediterranean Sea Convention].
In the recent Draft Protocol to the Mediterranean Sea Convention signatories have for
the first time undertaken to change national policies, including industrial siting policies, to
accord with the Protocol's terms. See [19801 3 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 189 for a reprint of
the full text.
48. See art. 2 of the ECE Convention, quoted in the text accompanying note 22 supra.
49. Id.
50. See notes 3 & 17 supra.
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Transboundary air pollution is governed not by international law but
by national self-interest. That self-interest, however, combined with the
consciousness-raising effect of vigorous international discussion and nego-
tiation about sulfur and carbon pollutants and their potentially irreversi-
ble effects, can induce thoughtful and enlightened public officials to show
concern and try to abate acid rain and CO, for their own nation's future.
In this respect, 1980 was an important year. With government sup-
port, West German scientists began ambitious research programs on the
effects of acid deposition"1 on conifer forests and on buildings and monu-
ments, including the Cologne Cathedral. The United States committed
large sums to research the effects of acid deposition and to develop new
pollution control technology. Significant progress has been made in devel-
oping a unique "low NOx" boiler to drastically reduce nitrogen oxide
emissions from coal burning facilities.52 The Ontario Ministry of the En-
vironment ordered the INCO smelting plant at Sudbury, Ontario-the
single largest pollution source in the world, emitting one million tons of
sulfur pollutants annually into the atmosphere-to reduce SO, emissions
by more than fifty percent by December 1982.58 Finally, most Western
European countries reduced their annual S0 2 emissions by efficiently em-
ploying low-cost sulfur control strategies, such as burning low-sulfur coal
and oil, washing coal before combustion, and producing more electricity
from sulfur-free nuclear power."
VIII. CONCLUSION
International organizations and agreements serve the essential func-
tion of educating the international political community. They help to
build a consensus about a transnational problem and to develop a context
in which sovereign states pursue pro-international policies by perceiving
51. "Acid depostion" is more technically correct than "acid rain." It encompasses rain,
snow, sleet, mist, hail, fog, dew, and frost, as well as dry deposition of fine sulfate
particulates.
52. Nitrogen oxides are precursors to nitric acid, which accounts for one-third of the
acid in North American acid rain. See President Carter's Second Message to Congress on
the Environment, 15 WEKLY COMP. oF PREs. Doc. 1353 (AUG. 2, 1979).
53. Ontario and Canadian federal officials made it clear that the INCO control order
was designed to strengthen Canada's position in the United States-Canada negotiations and
to pressure the United States to take corresponding measures against U.S. sources of acid
rain. See [1980] 3 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 234-35. Environmental officials in both countries
seem to be telling one another, in effect, "If you lean on us more, we'll be able to justify
stronger control measures."
54. It is, of course, impossible to know whether the same strategies would have been
employed in the absence of international discussion ("consciousness-raising") of trans-
boundary air pollution and the effects of acid rain. The net result, however, is to reduce the
total sulfur load in Europe's atmosphere. There are indications, however, that increased
emissions from Eastern Europe may have offset any Western Europe reductions. But East-
ern European countries, all signatories of the ECE Convention, have become conscious of
the long-range transboundary air pollution problem much more recently than Western Eu-
rope, where the Europe-dominated Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment has been discussing transboundary air pollution for almost a decade.
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that it is in their own interest to do so. By making and keeping issues like
transboundary air pollution or world climate change salient topics for in-
ternational investigation, discussion, and negotiation, they create a ripple
effect. International monitoring, data gathering, and scientific research
help to form a consensus among scientists that a problem is serious and
deserves remedial action. Sooner or later these ripples are bound to reach
policymakers and concerned citizens and to influence national agendas. In
this lies the main hope for progress in international environmental pro-
tection generally, and in long-range transboundary air pollution
specifically.

